Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 16
Issue 1 Ninth Circuit Survey

Article 9

January 1986

Criminal Law and Procedure
Elisa R. Paisner
Michael S. Williams

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Elisa R. Paisner and Michael S. Williams, Criminal Law and Procedure, 16 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (1986).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss1/9

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

Paisner and Williams: Criminal Law and Procedure

CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE

LEVINE v. UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT:

GAG ORDERS-THE SILENT BAR
....
T

INTRODUCTION

The Ninth Circuit in Levine v. United States District
Court l granted a petition for a .writ of mandamus to review a
district court's order prohibiting the attorneys in a criminal trial
from communicating with the media. 2
The Ninth Circuit held that the defense attorneys' extrajudicial comments justifiably posed a serious and imminent threat
to the administration of justiceS and that less restrictive alterna1. 764 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1985) (per Beezer, J.; the other panel members were Sneed,
J., special concurring opinion, and Nelson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part),
petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3533 (U.S. Jan. 29, 1986) (No. 85-1291).
2. [d. at 591.
3. [d. at 598. The case had been the subject of considerable national and local media
attention. [d. at 592. At issue were various pretrial statements made by defense attorneys to a reporter for the Los Angeles Times, including allegations that the FBI had
exaggerated the evidence against the defendants. Defense attorneys claimed that the
government was unable to establish that Miller had actually passed documents to the
Russians or had caused a breach to national security interests. Defense attorneys also
claimed that the dismissal of various counts against the Ogorodnikovs for aiding and
abetting espionage was a concession of a weak case and that the government's case was
based solely on Miller's admissions made after five days of questioning. [d.
Defense attorneys also provided detailed portions of their own case strategy. 764
F.2d at 592. During an interview with the Los Angeles Times, defense attorneys stated
that they intended to show that Svetlana Ogorodnikova was an emotionally troubled and
alcoholic FBI informant with a marginal IQ who thought she was helping the FBI. Further, the article revealed that through her sexual relationship with Miller and, earlier
with another FBI counterintelligence agent, Svetlana Ogorodnikova was used as a means
of infiltrating the Soviet intelligence network. Additionally, it was claimed that Miller
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tives to the gag order were not available. 4 The court found, however, that the restraining order as issued was overbroadll because
many statements that bore "upon the merits to be resolved by
the jury" would present no danger to the administration of justice. s Accordingly, the district court was ordered to determine
which types of extrajudicial statements posed a serious and imminent threat, and to fashion the order specifying the proscribed types of statements. 7 This was the first gag order in any
circuit to be upheld on a district court's finding that a serious
and imminent threat to the administration of justice existed because of the attorneys' comments. 8
too was a bumbler who, fearing that he would be pulled from the case because of his past
record, did not tell his superiors of his attempt to infiltrate the Soviet network. The
defense also reported that they intended to show that Nikolay Ogorodnikov, sympathetic
with his wife's personal problems, had allowed her to live with him and their son and was
indicted only because of 'guilt by association.' Overend, Lawyers Contend FBI E;laggerated Evidence in Spy Case, Los Angeles Times, Mar. 3, 1985, V1, at 3, col. 1.
4. 764 F.2d at 599-600.
5. Id. at 598-99.
6. Id. at 599.
7. Id. at 599-601.
8. Id. at 597-98. The district court stated that:
[I]n view of the comments contained in the Los Angeles
Times article, it is plain that the serious and imminent threat
to a fair trial outweighs any First Amendment rights at stake.
To claim that the need to argue a client's case in detail in the
press on the eve of trial is mandated by an ethical or legal
responsibility belittles the government's, the defendants', and
most importantly in this instance, the public's right to a fair
trial before an unbiased jury.
With the nearness of trial, the potential for prejudice becomes particularly acute. There's nothing in the Code of Professional Responsibility requiring or even recommending that
an attorney argue his . . . case in the press or on the courthouse steps.

Instead, it is the integrity of our judicial process that is
fundamentally at stake. This trial will not become a circus
show performed outside the courtroom, yet defense counsel's
actions clearly foreshadow such an eventuality if this court
does not take action .
. . . [T]his court finds it quite reasonable to expect that such
publicity has been and will become even more pervasive, creating in effect a lobbying effort by counsel on behalf of their
clients. The public has a right to expect a fairer trial than
that.

Id.
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II. FACTS
Richard W. Miller, a former FBI agent, and Svetlana
Ogorodnikova and her husband, Nikolay Ogorodnikov were
charged with espionage. 9 Initially the district court, aware of
government and defense attorneys' "on the record" interviews
with the media, admonished counsel to maintain an atmosphere
in which a fair trial could be conducted. 1o When additional comments by counsel subsequently appeared in a news article just
prior to the Ogorodnikovs' trial,ll the district court issued a restraining order silencing the attorneys from making statements
to the news media. 12
On appeal, defense attorneys argued that the district court's
order was an unconstitutional restraint on the media's ability to
gather news. 13 Additionally, defense attorneys claimed that the
district court's findings were inadequate, unsupported by the
record, and would not properly sustain its gag order. For these
reasons, appellants contended that the order abridged their first
amendment right to free speech.14
9. 764 F.2d at 591-92. On October 2, 1984, Richard W. Miller and Svetlana
Ogorodnikova and Nikolay Ogorodnikov, were arrested and charged, inter alia, with conspiring to transmit national defense and classified information to agents and representatives of the Soviet Union. An indictment was returned on October 12, 1984 naming all
three defendants; a superseding indictment was returned in November, 1984. The indictment also named Aleksandr Grishin, Vice Counsel, Soviet Consulate, San Francisco, Ca.,
as an unindicted co-conspirator. [d. The Ogorodnikovs' trial was severed on January 22,
1985 and the government's case was soon to proceed at the time of the district court's
restraining order. [d.
lO. [d. at 592. During a status conference on November 6, 1984, the district court
admonished the parties not to engage in pretrial publicity. [d. In response to additional
comments made by the defense counsel to the media, the government filed a motion for
an order restraining extrajudicial statements by the parties and their agents on November 22, 1984. [d. The district court denied the motion on December 14, 1984 but again
sought the cooperation of counsel. [d. Defense attorneys advised the district court that
they might "at some future time deem it necessary in the interest of our client to make a
statement outside the courtroom." [d.
11. See supra note 9.
12. 764 F.2d at 593. The government renewed its motion for the restraining order in
order to protect the rights of all parties and the public to a fair trial. [d. A hearing was
held on March 5, 1985, where Levine acknowledged that he had spoken with the reporter
although he had not been quoted. [d. After reviewing the statements reported in the
article, the district court ordered the restraining order encompassing all attorneys, all
parties, their representatives and agents, and witnesses. [d. In June, the district court
removed the parties and the witnesses from the scope of the order. [d.
13. [d. at 594.
14. [d. at 595. Appellants argued that the order could be upheld only if the govern-
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II. BACKGROUND

A.

FAIR TRIAL-FREE PRESS

The Supreme Court has long held that the very essence of a
fair trial as guaranteed by the sixth amendment is dependent
upon a panel of impartial jurors, free from outside influences. Iii
The pervasiveness of modern news coverage l6 has set an accused's sixth amendment right to a fair trial against the press'
first amendment right to be free from governmental restraint. 17
The publicity which attends certain criminal trials has required the Supreme Court to establish guidelines concerning the
ment had shown that an impartial jury could not be selected, that the district court had
overstated the amount of publicity in the case, and that the order was both vague and
overbroad. Id. at 598-99. Appellants also challenged the district court's finding that less
restrictive alternatives to the restraining order were not available. Id. They argued that a
searching voir dire would eliminate any bias caused by pretrial publicity and that the
record did not prove that jurors would not follow emphatic and clear instructions by the
court. Id. at 599-600.
15. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965)(the right to a fair trial held to
be "the most fundamental of all freedoms"); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,721 (1965)(an
accused's sixth amendment right to a panel of unbiased jurors held to be "most priceless"); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 551 (1976); and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966).
16. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 362. In Sheppard, Justice Clark noted that
"[g)iven the pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to
ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused." Id.
Earlier in Irvin v. Dowd, Justice Frankfurter observed that in each term substantial
claims were made that a jury trial had been distorted because of inflammatory newspaper accounts making it difficult, if not impossible, to secure an unbiased jury. 366 U.S. at
730. See also Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 195 (1952)(extensive adverse modern
coverage, albeit pervasive and prejudicial, does not alone presumptively deprive an accused of his right to a fair trial).
17. The sixth amendment provides that "[iJn all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.... " U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. The first amendment states that "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press .... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The Supreme Court has observed that
[aJ responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the
criminal field .... The Press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors and the judicial
processes to extensive scrutiny and criticism.
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,350 (1966). See Nebraska Press Aas'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 561 (1976); CBS v. United States District Court, 729 F.2d 1174, 1178 (9th Cir.
1983).
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judiciary's power to restrict prejudicial publicity. IS In Sheppard
v. Maxwell,19 the Supreme Court reversed a conviction of murder because the lower court failed to invoke procedures to protect the defendant from the massive, pervasive and prejudicial
publicity that attended his prosecution. 20 The defendant,
charged with bludgeoning his pregnant wife to death in their
home, was, from the outset, the focus of official attention and
the subject of media headlines.21 The lower court had further
failed to take adequate steps to control the media's conduct in
the courtroom.22 The lack of any restraints on the press had resulted in bedlam and an atmosphere that the Ohio Supreme
Court labelled a "Roman Holiday" for the news media. 23 The
United States Supreme Court found that the trial court's "fundamental error" in permitting such an unrestrained atmosphere
was exacerbated by the court's disavowal that it had the power
to control the publicity about the triap· The Supreme Court
confirmed the trial court's authority and responsibility to pro18. "In an overwhelming majority of criminal trials, pretrial publicity presents few
unmanageable threats to [an accused's sixth amendment right]. But when the case is a
"sensational" one tensions develop between the right of the accused to a trial by an
impartial jury and the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment." Nebraska Press
Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 551.
19. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
20. [d. at 335.
21. [d. The totality of the circumstances in the Sheppard prosecution had denied
the accused a fair trial. For months before the trial, virulent publicity made the case
notorious. Headline stories concentrated on Sheppard's lack of cooperation and refusal
to take a lie detector test. [d. at 338. An inquest was called where Sheppard was
searched in full view of a swarm of media personnel and a multitude of spectators and
ended with the defense attorney excluded from the room. [d. at 339-40. His personal life
and extramarital affairs were aired and manipulated. [d. at 340. By the time Sheppard
was convicted there were enough media clippings to fill five volumes. [d. at 342.
Twenty-five days before trial, 75 veniremen were called as prospective jurors. Their
names and addresses were published and many received letters and phone calls regarding the prosecution. [d. at 342. The jurors were continually exposed to the media and
even had their pictures taken in the jury box and jury room. [d. at 345. Only given
"suggestions" and "requests" not to comment on the case, jurors were pursued by the
media and thrust into the "role of celebrities." [d. at 353. Much of the material printed
or broadcast was never heard from the witness stand. [d. at 360.
22. The Supreme Court found numerous instances where bedlam reigned during the
trial. Twenty reporters sat at a table only a few feet away from the counsel's table and
jury box. Representatives of the media filled the majority of the courtroom, taking a
front seat to the defendant's own family. Reporters moved in and out of the courtroom
causing confusion and disruption. The media had total freedom in the corridors and were
accosting those entering and leaving the courtroom. [d. at 355. Only belatedly were the
reporters asked not to handle the evidence. [d. at 358.
23. [d. at 356.
24. [d. at 357.
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tect a defendant's right to a fair trial consistent with due process. 21i To assure this mandate, the Supreme Court enumerated
measures available to trial courts in order to avoid the problems
that beleaguered the case. 26 These procedures included regulating the conduct of newsmen and controlling information released by counsel for both sides. 27
The problem of prejudicial publicity had already manifested
itself in cases preceding Sheppard. 28 The cumulative effect led
the Supreme Court in Sheppard to caution trial courts of the
need to take "strong measures" to ensure that the delicate balance between fair trial and open press "is never weighed against
the accused."29 With this directive, Sheppard provided the precedent for the future course of fair trial-free press issues. 30
1.

The Right to Report Events
Trial courts began utilizing restraining orders to prevent the

25. Id. at 358-62.
26. These measures included adopting stricter rules for the use of the courtroom by
the media, limiting their number, and more closely supervising their courtroom conduct.
Further, the Supreme Court stated that the court should have insulated the witnesses;
controlled the release of leads, information and gossip to the press by police officers,
witnesses and counsel; and proscribed extrajudicial statements by lawyers, witnesses,
parties or court officials divulging prejudicial matters. Additionally, the Supreme Court
pointed out that the court could request appropriate city officials to regulate information
released by their employees. 384 U.S. at 358-62. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356,
366 n.8 (4th Cir. 1979)(noting that these procedures have been interpreted as a directive
rather than a suggestion).
Chief Justice Burger, in Nebraska Press Ass'n, listed traditional alternatives to prior
restraints of publication: (a) a change of venue; (b) postponement of the trial date; (c)
searching voir dire; (d) use of emphatic and clear instructions; and (e) sequestration. 427
U.S. at 565 (citing with approval Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 357-62 (1966)).
27. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 358-62.
.
28. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 550-51 (1965)(defendant denied due process where the televising of his entire trial affected jurors, witnesses and judge); Rideau
v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 724-27 (1963)(refusal to change venue of trial denial of due
process where film of defendant confessing to sheriff was shown three times on TV and
seen in a community of approximately 150,000); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723-28
(1961)(conviction of murder overturned where extensive publicity affected pool of veniremen and newspaper coverage which appeared in 95% of homes in county included details of defendant's background, previous criminal record, line-up identification, and
confessions).
29. 384 U.S. at 362.
30. See Portman, The Defense of Trial from Sheppard to Nebraska Press Association: Benign Neglect to Affirmative Action and Beyond, 29 STAN. L. REV. 393, 403 (1977).
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publication of prejudicial material. 31 In one line of cases, courts
have attempted to restrain the right of the press to report events
relating to criminal proceedings. 32 However, in Nebraska Press
Association u. Stuart,33 the Supreme Court invalidated such a
restraining order on first amendment grounds. 3 • The crime,
which took place in a small rural community, involved a brutal
murder.3l1 A description of the suspect was released by the police
and immediately attracted extensive local, regional and national
news coverage. 36 The trial court found that the potential for pretrial publicity concerning the murder posed a threat to the accused's right to a fair trial. 37
The gag order in Nebraska Press Association prohibited
members of a state press association from publishing or broadcasting accounts or admissions and other facts, "strongly implicative" of the defendant as the murderer, that were made to
persons other than the press. 38 The Supreme Court reversed the
conviction because the trial court failed to show that the alternatives to prior restraints outlined in Sheppard 39 would be in31. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. 539, 543-46 (1976)(gag order prohibited state press association from publishing accounts, admissions and information
strongly implicative of accused as murderer).
32. See, e.g., id.; CBS v. United States District Court, 729 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir.
1983)(district court's order restraining television network from disseminating and/or
broadcasting any portion of government's surveillance tapes violated first amendment
guarantee of the press where no showing that unchecked publicity would distort views of
potential jurors).
33. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
34. [d. at 570. The Supreme Court set forth the following three-part test for evaluating the constitutionality of prior restraints on the press:
[W]e must examine the evidence before the trial judge when
the order was entered to determine (a) the nature and extent
of pretrial news coverage; (b) whether other measures would
be likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity; and (c) how effectively a restraining order would operate
to prevent the threatened danger.
[d. at 562.
35. [d. at 542. In a small rural town in Nebraska of about 850 people, defendant had
murdered six members of a family in their home during the course of a sexual assault.
[d.
36. [d.

37. The trial court's conclusion "as to the impact of such publicity ... was of necessity speculative, dealing as he was with factors unknown and unknowable." [d. at 563.
38. [d. at 568.
39. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 563-64 (citing with approval Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966». See supra note 26.
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sufficient to mitigate the adverse effects of pretrial publicity,40
because the restraining order would not serve its intended purpose,41 and because the prohibition regarding "implicative" information was too vague and too overbroad to survive the scrutiny given to restraints on first amendment rights. 42 Applying a
"clear and present danger" standard,43 the Court reaffirmed the
presumptive invalidity of prior restraints" and unanimously invalidated the order. 411
40. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 565-68.
41. [d. The Supreme Court noted that because the murders took place in such a

small community, rumors would have spread by word of mouth even without the news
accounts. Further, since the order also prohibited the reporting of evidence adduced at
an open preliminary hearing it violated first amendment principles: "[T)here is nothing
that prOscribes the press from reporting events that transpire in the courtroom." [d. at
568 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966».
42. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 568.
43. [d. at 562. Chief Justice Burger adopted the "clear and present danger" test
articulated in the Court of Appeals decision by Judge Learned Hand in United States u.
Dennis. In Dennis, defendants, leaders of the Communist Party in the United States
were convicted under the Smith Act for conspiring to teach and advocate the overthrow
and destruction of the United States by force and violence. 183 F.2d 201, 205-06 (2d Cir.
1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494, 497 (1951).
Judge Hand stated that the validity of subsequent punishment under the Smith Act
is determined by whether "the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." 183 F.2d at 212.
But see Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of Freedom and Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REV. 431, 459-61 (1977)(questioning the appropriateness of
this test by suggesting that it is both inconsistent in light of Chief Justice Burger's own
differentiation of first amendment considerations between subsequent punishment and
prior restraints and a weak and amorphous standard).
44. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 558. Chief Justice Burger characterized prior
restraints as, "the most serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights .... A prior restraint ... has an immediate and irreversible sanction. If it can
be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication 'chills' speech, prior
restraint 'freezes' it at least for a time." [d. at 559. See New York Times v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota ex rei. Olson, 283 U.S. 197 (1931).
45. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 570-617. Five separate opinions were published. Chief Justice Burger reaffirmed that first amendment protection was not absolute, but that the presumption against prior restraints remains intact. [d. at 570. Justice
White added that there was a grave doubt in his mind as to whether restraints on the
press could ever be justified. [d. (White, J., concurring). Justice Powell emphasized the
heavy burden that rests on any party who seeks a prior restraint on pretrail publicity. [d.
at 571-72 (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Stewart and Justice Marshall would have held
that a prior restraint on the freedom of the press was unconstitutionally impermissible
as a means of protecting a defendant's right to a fair trial. [d. at 572 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, agreed with Justice Brennan, but was not so willing to give the
same absolute protection, without considering the nature and means by which the information was obtained. [d. at 617 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Recently, in Columbia Broadcasting Systems v. United
States District Court/'s the Ninth Circuit invalidated a similar
order restraining a television network from disseminating or
broadcasting any portion of the surveillance tapes made while
the government was investigating John DeLorean's involvement
in a major cocaine transaction. 47 The appellate court disagreed
with the district court's contention that the nature of the tapes
distinguished this case from other publicized trials. 48 Applying
the test enumerated in Nebraska Press Association,49 the court
noted that a prior restraint is invalid "unless it is 'clear that future publicity, unchecked, would so distort the views of potential
jurors that 12 could not be found who would ... fulfill their
sworn duty.' "110 The court instead considered the nature of the
casellI and the venue of the triaP2 It looked not only to the effect that the videotape might have had on individual viewers but
also to the impact that the publicity might have had to imflame
and prejudice the entire community. liS The court found that the
defendant's activities in a nonviolent crime were insufficiently
lurid or sensational, despite the defendant's prominence, to taint
all of the twelve million people in the Central District of Califor46. 729 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1983). See Note, John Z. DeLorean v. The Media: The
Right To A Fair Trial Without A Prior Restraint Upon The Media, 15 GOLDEN GATE
U.L. REV. 81 (1985).
47. 729 F.2d at 1176.
48. [d. at 1180.
49. See supra note 34.
50. 729 F.2d at 1180 (emphasis in original) (quoting Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539, 569).
51. 729 F.2d at 1181. The court found that in cases in which the defendant was
denied a fair trial, there was lurid and inflammatory subject matter involving violence
and passion. On the other hand, cases involving other offenses, such as white collar
crime, do not pose the same danger. The Ninth Circuit cited with approval the District
of Columbia Circuit which stated about the Watergate case that it "may come as a surprise to lawyers and judges, but it is simply a fact of life that matters which interest
them may be less fascinating to the public generally." [d. (quoting United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 62 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
52. 729 F.2d at 1181-82. In large urban areas courts have held that prejudicial publicity is a lesser danger than in small rural communities "where [tlhe whole community
... becomes interested in all the morbid details." [d. at 1181 (quoting Estes v. Texas,
381 U.S. 532, 545 (1965)). The court in CBS also commented that in addition to the large
population in the Central District of California, the heterogeneity of the district was also
a significant factor making it unlikely that even the most sensational case would become
a cause celebre. 729 F.2d at 1181.
53. [d. at 1180. The Ninth Circuit noted that the district court failed to make such
an analysis. For that reason alone, the court found that the district court's conclusion
that the release of the surveillance tapes would be prejudicial was suspect. [d.
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nia. G4 The Ninth Circuit further confirmed the validity of traditional methods utilized in avoiding prejudicial publicity, short of
the prior restraint. GG
2.

The Right of Access

Courts have further attempted to minImize the effect of
prejudicial publicity by restraining the media's access to criminal proceedings. G6 For the first time, in Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. u. Virginia,G7 the Supreme Court concluded that the first
and fourteenth amendments afforded the public and the media
the right of access to a criminal trial. G8 In the words of the
Court, "absent an overriding interest articulated in the findings,
the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public."G9 The
Court reasoned that historically the presence of the public and
the media at a criminal trial have significantly enhanced the integrity and the quality of the judicial processes. 60 Despite the
fact that this was the accused's fourth trial,61 the Supreme Court
found that the trial court's order to close the proceedings was
defective since it had not considered alternative solutions such
54. Id. at 1181-82.
55. Id. at 1183. See supra note 26 for discussion of the traditional methods for

avoiding prejudicial publicity.
56. Compare Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 385 (1979) (sixth
amendment right to a public trial personal to accused and does not give the public or
press an enforceable right of access to a pretrial suppression hearing) with United States
v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982)(first amendment right of access to criminal
trials applies to suppression hearings). See also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980) ("presumption of openness" gives public right of access to crim·
inal trials); Associated Press v. United States District Court, 705 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir.
1983)(closure order pertaining to pretrial criminal documents violates public's first
amendment right d access).
57. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
58. Id. at 580. In Branzburg v. Hayes, the Supreme Court rejected the premise that
the first amendment afforded a reporter a constitutional testimonial privilege to refuse to
name his confidential sources when testifying pursuant to a grand jury subpoena. 408
U.S. 665, 702 (1972). However, the Court recognized that gathering of news qualified for
some first amendment protection. Id. at 681. In the context of a criminal trial, later
decisions, such as Richmond Newspapers, defined this right to attend the trial and to
report on what transpired. 448 U.S. at 576-77. See also KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Mari·
copa County Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 246, 678 P.2d 431, 441 (1984)(media liaison order
was proper exercise of trial court's duty to protect accused's right to a fair trial; sketch
order unconstitutional prior restraint on press' first amendment right of access).
59. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581.
60. Id. at 569-73.
61. Id. at 559. Defendant's conviction for murder after his first trial was reversed on
appeal and two subsequent retrials ended in mistrials. Id.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss1/9

10

Paisner and Williams: Criminal Law and Procedure

1986]

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

59

as the possibility of excluding witnesses or sequestering jurors.6l1
The closure order abridged the public's first amendment interests because the trial court and the parties had unfettered discretion in closing the proceeding. 63
Similarly, in Associated Press v. United States District
Court,64 the Ninth Circuit held that a district court's blanket
order sealing pretrial criminal documents violated the public's
first amendment right of access.611 Responding to the extensive
press coverage generated in the DeLorean case, the district court
issued the closure order sua sponte. 66 Even though some documents were to be sealed for only forty-eight hours, the Ninth
Circuit struck down the closure order because the trial court had
not shown that this procedure was "strictly and inescapably necessary in order to protect the fair-trial guarantee."67
B.

FAIR TRIAL-FREE SPEECH

Sheppard v. Maxwell 68 marked the first time that the Supreme Court recommended alternatives to restraints on the
press in order to mitigate the problems caused by pervasive publicity.69 The Supreme Court found that the inflammatory publicity which frustrated the trial court's function in that case might
62. ld. at 580-81 (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 357-62 (1966) and Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-65 (1976». See supra note 26.
63. 448 U.S. at 584-98 (Brennan, J., concurring).
64. 705 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1983).
65. ld. at 1145-47. In order to satisfy the burden in closing a trial the accused must
show:
[I] a substantial probability that irreparable damage to his
fair-trial right will result from conducting the proceeding in
public . . . [2] a substantial probability that alternatives to
closure will not protect adequately his right to a fair trial . . .
[3] a substantial probability that closure will be effective in
protecting against the preceived harm.
ld. at 1145-47 (citing United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1982».
66. 705 F.2d at 1144. The order was issued "without any notice to, or opportunity to
be heard by, the parties, the press, or the public." ld.
67. ld. at 1145. See also Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978)(no special protection for newspapers that might be searched by government authorities pursuant to a search warrant); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)(no constitutional testimonial privilege for reporters refusing to disclose names of confidential sources while
testifying pursuant to grand jury subpoena).
68. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
69. ld. at 362-63. See supra note 26.
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well have been prevented by effective control of the sources. 70
Specifically, the Court called for silencing extrajudicial statements made by the trial participants. 71
1.

Restraints on Attorneys: Disciplinary Rule 7-107

In 1969, the American Bar Association adopted DR 7-107 to
give force to an attorney's ethical obligations to prevent adverse
trial publicity.72 Taking its cue from case law, the rule is con70. 384 U.S. at 359-61. In Sheppard, prejudicial news accounts could be traced both
to the prosecution and the defense. Much of that evidence was never offered at trial. The
trial court "should have made some effort to control the release of leads, information and
gossip to the press by police officers, witnesses and the counsel for both sides." 1d. at
359.
71. 1d. "[T]he trial court might well have proscribed extrajudicial statements by any
lawyer, party, witness, or court official which divulged prejudicial matters, such as ...
statements concerning the merits of the case." 1d. at 361. The Supreme Court has seen
that the cure lies in
those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its
inception. The courts must take steps by rule and regulation
that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside influences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused,
witnesses ... should be permitted to frustrate its function.
Collaboration between counsel and the press . . . is highly
censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures.
1d. at 362-63 (emphasis omitted).
72. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-107 (1969). California has
not adopted DR 7-107, nor has the Central District of California adopted a local rule
dealing specifically with extrajudicial statements.
See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE. FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, Standard 8Ll (1980):
Standard 8-1.1. Extrajudicial statements by attorneys:
(a) A lawyer shall not release or authorize the release of
information or opinion for dissemination by any means of
public communication if such dissemination would pose a
clear and present danger to the fairness of the trial.
(b) ... [F]rom the commencement of the investigation of
a criminal matter until the completion of trial or disposition
without trial, a lawyer may be subject to disciplinary action
with respect to extrajudicial statements concerning the following matters:
(i) the prior criminal record ... the character or reputation of the accused, or any opinion as to the accused's guilt or
innocence or as to the merits of the case or the evidence in the
case[.]
See also Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the
Jury System, "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391, 401-03 (1968). The Committee recommended action in three areas:
(1) that the district courts have the power and the duty to
control the release of prejudicial information by attorneys;
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cerned with the effects of prejudicial publicity on criminal jury
trials 73 and has withstood constitutional analysis. 74
In Hirschkop v. Snead,75 the Fourth Circuit noted that attorneys, as officers of the court, have a fiduciary duty "to the
court, to the litigants ... and to the public to protect the judicial processes from extraneous influences which impair its
fairness. "76
In Hirschkop, a Virginia attorney brought suit challenging
the constitutionality of that state's disciplinary rule restricting
recommends action by local rule to restrict the release of such
information; (2) that a similar power existed to restrict disclosures by court personnel; and (3) that each district provide by
local rule for specific orders governing the proceedings in any
case in which prejudicial influences might otherwise penetrate
a trial.
[d. at 401.

73. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 550 (1976).
74. Two circuits have upheld in principle the enforcement of ethical rules restricting
lawyers' comments concerning pending cases. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 374
(4th Cir. 1979)(upholding disciplinary rules as applied to criminal jury trials, requiring a
reasonable likelihood standard). The Hirschkop court applied the two-step test formulated in Procunier v. Martinez for determining the constitutionality of governmental restraints on speech: "First, the regulation ... in question must further an important or
substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of the expression ....
Second, the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the particular governmental interest involved." [d. at 363 (citing
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974)). But ct. Chicago Council of Lawyers v.
Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Cunningham v. Chicago
Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976)(disciplinary rules upheld but must incorporate
"serious and imminent danger" standard into specific rules governing conduct).
75. 594 F.2d at 366. The court ruled that Hirschkop had standing to challenge the
rule even though there were no pending complaints charging him with violations.
Hirschkop, who was active in civil rights and civil liberties matters, had 22 complaints
filed against him from 1965 to 1975. When the State Bar Executive Committee admitted
that the claims were meritless, Hirschkop agreed to drop his claims against the State
Bar. The settlement agreement, however, did not consider the rule's constitutionality nor
immunize the attorney from appropriate disciplinary action in the future. [d. at 363.
76. 594 F.2d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 1979). In his concurring opinion in Nebraska Press
Ass'n, Justice Brennan stated that:
As officers of the court, court personnel and attorneys have a
fiduciary responsibility not to engage in public debate that
will redound to the detriment of the accused or that will obstruct the fair administration of justice. It is very doubtful
that the court would not have the power to control release of
information by these individuals ... and to impose suitable
limitations whose transgression could result in disciplinary
proceedings.
427 U.S. at 601 n.27 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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attorneys' comments about pending litigation. 77 In sustaining
the constitutionality of the disciplinary rule, the Fourth Circuit
reasoned that the rule amounted to a legislative finding that certain speech for publication by an attorney engaged in pending or
contemplated litigation would be so inherently prejudicial to the
system's integrity and an accused's right to a fair trial that it
may be proscribed. 78 Because questions of the admissibility of
evidence were undecided at the time of publication, the Fourth
Circuit was satisfied that speech which had a "reasonable likelihood of interference" with a fair trial was contemplated by the
rule. 79 The court found that Virginia's rule was definitive as to
the types of statements it proscribed. 80 Further, since the rule
was distinguishable from a prior restraint, as it imposed sanctions post-judgment, the court declined to impose the more
stringent "clear and present danger" standard devised for and
applicable to prior restraints. 81
In Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,82 the Seventh Circuit stated that where there is tension between an attorney's
right to free speech and an accused's right to fair trial, the former must yield to the latter.8s The court conceded that an attorney's statements may be the source of prejudicial publicity necessitating prohibitions on their speech.84 At the same time,
however, the court noted that countervailing factors exist, especially for the defense. 86 It stated that, as sources of crucial infor77. Hirschkop, 594 F.2d at 374.
78. Id. at 366-67.
79. Id. As an example, the court noted that premature release of a defendant's prior
record or confession before the trial court had ruled on its admissibility would threaten
the integrity of subsequent proceedings. Id. at 368.
80.Id.
81. Id. at 368 n.13. The court stated that if the defendant decided not to contest the
admissibility of his confession, or, having contested it, the court ruled against him, there
was only a potential for prejudice. The court could not be certain that the standard
requiring a clear and present danger or serious and imminent danger would ever be met.
Id.
82. 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Cunningham v. Chicago
Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). In this case, an association of local attorneys
brought a proceeding for declaratory judgment and injunction against the enforcement of
local "no-comment" rules seeking to proscribe extrajudicial statements by attorneys during both civil and criminal cases. Id. at 247. The district court entered a judgment granting the motion of defendants and intervenors to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action.Id.
83. Id. at 248.
84. Id. at 250.
85.Id.
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mation, attorneys served an important function as a check on
the government by exposing abuses or urging action. 86 Further,
the attorney, who was more articulate and more knowledgeable
in the law than the accused, could best counter any injury to the
defendant or his family caused by the publicity generated when
it becomes publicly known that a person is under investigation
or has been indicted. 87
While not finding the "no-comment" rule a traditional prior
restraint, the Seventh Circuit recognized that the rule involved
86. [d. The dissenting opinion in the denial of rehearing en banc in Levine, stated:
"[T)he freedom to make ... a charge [that an indictment is
politically or religiously motivated) against the state is surely
paramount among the freedoms protected by the first amendment. To deprive an accused of his most valuable resource in
criticizing the government-his lawyer-is to restrict, and to
restrict severely, his first amendment rights."
775 F.2d 1054, 1055 (9th Cir. 1985)(Norris, J., dissenting).
87. 522 F.2d at 250. Moreover, as recognized by a prominent criminal defense attorney, defense attorneys will strive to neutralize the imbalance caused by the initial publication by the government by seeking a partial jury. CALIFORNIA DEFENDER 68 (Spring
1985)(interview with Howard L. Weitzman). Weitzman commented on the need to
orchestrate media exposure in the DeLorean case:
In determining whether or not to work with the press, you
should first consider whether the government used the press
Inevitably the government uses the press ... to begin a
campaign in an attempt to bias and prejudice the public image
of the defendants .... [I)t is encumbent upon the defense
attorney representing a client in a high publicity case to attempt to neutralize the negative publicity....
It must be remembered that the potential jurors read the
press releases and come into court with an impression in high
profile cases of what the case is all about.
CALIFORNIA DEFENDER at 69.
See also 775 F.2d at 1055. The dissenting opinion from the denial of rehearing en
banc in Levine found it implicit in Judge Beezer's majority and Judge Sneed's concurring opinions that there was something improper and even possibly unethical for a lawyer not to limit his client's defense to in-court statements. This, the dissent argued, was
a myopic view considering that whel', as in this case, an indictment is the subject of
great public interest, the damage to the accused's reputation and the resulting emotional
distress can be magnified.
The range of options available to the lawyer must include
speaking out publicly to mitigate the damage to the client in
the eyes of the community at large. Marshalled against the accused is not only the awesome resources and prestige of the
United States Government, but also the power of the media to
disseminate the government's charges.
[d.
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inherent features that were similar to prior restraints. 88 The
court ruled, therefore, that "[o]nly those comments that pose a
'serious and imminent threat' of interference with the fair administration of justice can be constitutionally proscribed. "89
2.

Prior Restraints on Trial Participants

A majority of courts have upheld gag orders on trial participants. 90 These courts are in disagreement, however, as to which
standard is appropriate to determine the validity of the order. In
In re Russell,9} the court found that a gag order prohibiting witnesses from discussing proposed trial testimony with the media
did not violate the witnesses' first amendment rights. 92 Petitioners were selected as potential witnesses in a criminal proceeding
88. 522 F.2d at 248·49. The court noted that a prior restraint constituted a predetermined judicial prohibition restraining specific expression. This order could not be violated even if the judicial action was unconstitutional as long as opportunities for appeal
existed. Id. at 248. "The validity of the rules, however, can be challenged by one prosecuted for violating them since ... there is a fundamental distinction ... between actions taken by the court in its legislative role and those taken in its adjudicative role."
Id.
89. Id. at 249. The court emphasized that while the "serious and imminent threat"
of interference would eliminate overbreadth, specific rules were also necessary to avoid
vagueness. Id. at 249·50. As an example, the phrase "participating in or associated with
the investigation" as used in the local "no-comment" rule and the American Bar Association rule proscribing extrajudicial statements during the investigating stage was found to
be too vague as applied to defense attorneys. The local rule could be used to establish a
presumption of serious and imminent threat to a fair trial only as applied to government
attorneys. Id. at 252-53. The term "merits" as incorporated into that rule excluded those
statements which were arguably opinions on merits and 'which should not be restricted,
then it could properly be used creating a presumption of a serious and imminent threat.
Id. at 255.
90. See, e.g., In re Russell, 726 F.2d 1007, 1010 (4th Cir.) (gag order prohibiting
potential witnesses from discussing their proposed trial testimony with news media did
not violate witnesses' first amendment rights), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct 134 (1984); United
States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666 (10th Cir.)(order prohibiting trial participants'
statements regarding the merits of the case did not violate first amendment), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969); Central South Carolina Chapter of Professional Journalists v.
Martin, 431 F. Supp. 1182, 1190 (D.S.C. 1977)(society of news media establishments
sought injunctive relief against court order restraining trial participants from "mingling"
with the press near the courthouse and from giving news interviews not impermissibly
vague or overbroad), aff'd in part, 556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1022 (1978); KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Maricopa County Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 246,
678 P.2d 431 (1984)(media liaison order was proper exercise of trial court's duty to protect accused's right to a fair trial; sketch order unconstitutional prior restraint on press'
first amendment right of access).
91. 726 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 134 (1984).
92. Id. at 1010.
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against alleged members of the Ku Klux Klan and Nazi Party
that involved a shooting incident in Greensboro, North Carolina. 93 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the publicity which
the trial had already attracted, together with the inflammatory
and prejudicial statements that reasonably could be expected
from the witnesses, and the ineffectiveness of alternative methods available, supported the trial court's determination that
there was a reasonable likelihood that the defendants would be
denied a fair trial. 9' The court also found that the order was not
vague or overbroad when it prohibited the witnesses from making extrajudicial statements related to their testimony, or to any
other party or issue which they might reasonably expect to be
involved in the case, or to any of the events leading up to the
incident. 91i
Similarly, in United States v. Tijerina,96 the Tenth Circuit
upheld an order forbidding extrajudicial statements made by the
trial participants concerning, among other things, the merits of
the case and evidence. 97 At issue were various statements made
by the defendants at a public political convention. 98 The court
found these statements endangered the rights of the defendants
and the government to a fair and impartial jury.99 It further
found that a fair trial applied to both the prosecution and the
defense. loo Thus, the court rejected the defendants' contention
that they could not be charged with a violation of the order because the order was entered for their protection. IOI Since there
was a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news would affect an
impartial jury and prevent a fair trial, the court found that the
defendants' first amendment rights had not been violated. lo2
An order similar to the one issued in Tijerina was struck
down by the Seventh Circuit in Chase v. Robson. lo3 Defendants
93. Id. at 1008.

94. Id. at 1010.
95. Id. at 1011.
96. 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969).
97. Id. at 663.
98.Id.
99. Id. at 665.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970)(per curiam).
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had been charged with removing and destroying selective service
records maintained at the Chicago area headquarters. lo", The
trial court based its order on newspaper accounts that were
seven months old as well as the defense attorney's past association with William Kunstler, an attorney not involved in the
case. lOll Unlike the Tijerina court, the Seventh Circuit required a
showing of a clear and present danger of a serious and imminent
threat to the administration of justice before allowing the gag
order. IDe The court found that the dated newspaper accounts
and the defense attorney's past association with a well-known
attorney were not only insufficient for the stricter standard, but
also did not satisfy the lesser finding of a reasonable likelihood
of a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. lo7 Moreover the court found that the order, which applied
to the fifteen defendants and their three attorneys, was unconstitutionally overbroad as it also included unprohibited
speech. IDS
In In re Halkin,109 an order which prohibited extrajudicial
disclosure of information by counsel and parties was deficient
because the order did not specify the reasons for the prohibition. 110 Defendant charged that certain government agencies had
conducted unlawful surveillance of United States citizens who
opposed the Vietnam War.lll The order barred the parties and
their counsel from making statements about information obtained through discovery, and from publicly disclosing the material, except as such material became part of the record. 112 The
District of Columbia Circuit found that the order prohibiting
political expression was overbroad since there were no expressed
findings, no reasons articulated, and no evidence presented as to
whether publication would preclude a fair trial. 113
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

[d. at 1060.
[d.
[d. at 1061.
[d.
[d.

109. 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979).
110. [d. at 196-97.
111. [d. at 180.
112. [d. at 179.
113. [d. at 196-97. When the order was issued, however, the trial court had actually
only examined, in addition to the moving papers, memoranda and the parties' correspondence, a two paragraph letter from plaintiff's counsel describing three documents and
photocopies that the plaintiffs proposed to release to the media, and a draft press release
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III. COURT'S ANALYSIS
A.

MAJORITY

The primary issue on appeal in Levine was whether the
district court should be compelled to dissolve its gag order silencing the attorneys from communicating with the media about
the merits of the case. 11 • The Ninth Circuit confirmed petitioner's characterization that the order was a prior restraint. m
Moreover, because the district court's order did not prohibit the
press from attending the criminal proceedings or reporting
about them,116 the Ninth Circuit distinguished the press issue
raised here from those issues raised in Associated Press v.
United States District Courtll7 and Columbia Broadcasting
Systems v. United States District Court.11S By denying the media access to the litigants, the court conceded that the gag order
raised a different first amendment issue by impairing the media's ability to gather news. ll9 The Ninth Circuit concluded,
however, that the petitioners lacked standing to assert the rights
of nonparty media organizations. 120
Thus the court's analysis focused on the attorneys' rights to
free speech.121 The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that the
restraining order against the defense attorneys prevented the
describing the significance of the documents. Id.
114. 764 F.2d at 591.
115. Id. at 595.
116. Id. at 594. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
117. 705 F.2d 1143, 1145·47 (9th Cir. 1983). See supra note 64 and accompanying
text.
118. 729 F.2d 1174, 1178·79 (9th Cir. 1983). See supra note 46 and accompanying
text.
119. 764 F.2d at 594. In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the Supreme
Court found that news gathering qualified for first amendment protection.Id. at 681. See
supra note 58. However, in KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Maricopa County Superior
Court, a media liaison order was found to be outside the scope of the press' first amend·
ment right to attend and report on criminal trials, and only to collaterally affect the
media's ability to interview trial participants. 139 Ariz. 246, 678 P.2d 431, 439 (1984).
120. 764 F.2d at 594. Subsequently, the Radio and Television News Association of
Southern California, an organization representing broadcast journalists, filed a petition
for writ of mandamus seeking to compel the district court to vacate its gag order. The
Ninth Circuit held that gag orders restraining trial counsel from making extrajudicial
statements to the news media, while indirectly denying the media access to trial partici·
pants, did not infringe on the first amendment rights of the press. Radio and T.V. News
Assoc. v. United States District Court, 781 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986).
121. Id. at 595.
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defendant from communicating with the media. 122 The court
reasoned that Miller had access to the media because he had
testified at the Ogorodnikovs' trial and was not prevented by the
gag order from issuing a statement through his family.123 Additionally, because the restraining order only limited extrajudicial
statements by Miller's attorneys, who were free to present his
case in open court, the Ninth Circuit did not decide whether the
gag order was permissible when a defendant could not communicate with the media. I24
Recognizing that restrictions on trial participants are an effective method of inhibiting excessive trial publicity as established in Sheppard v. Maxwell I25 and Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,128 the Ninth Circuit measured the district court's
order against the Supreme Court's requirements for determining
the validity of a prior restraint.127 While the court recognized
that the right to a fair trial is guaranteed to an accused by the
sixth amendment,128 it did not find that a corresponding right is
so afforded to the prosecutor as a litigant. 129 The court noted
that the defendant's interest in seeking a partial jury was to be
checked by society's interests and expectations in a fair result. ISO
The Ninth Circuit confirmed the district court's finding that
the publicity had created, and would continue to create, a clear
and present danger or serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. lSl Emphasis was placed on the fact that
122. [d. at 593 n.l.
123. [d. Implicit within the court's reasoning is the assumption that statements
made by the attorneys would be more credible, and therefore prejudicial, than statements made directly by the defendant at his co-defendant's trial or by the defendant's
family. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied sub nom., Cunningham v. Chicago Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
124. 764 F.2d at 593 n.l. The court also noted that this petition did not challenge
the government's ability to deny Miller direct contact with the media. [d.
125. 384 U.S. 333, 360-63 (1966).
126. 427 U.S. 539, 564 (1976).
127. 764 F.2d at 595. The Ninth Circuit held that such a challenge requires that the
party requesting the order show that: (1) the activity restrained poses either a clear and
present danger or a serious and imminent threat to a protected competing interest; (2)
the order is narrowly drawn; and (3) less restrictive alternatives are not available. Id.
(citations omitted).
128. [d. at 596.
129. [d. at 596-97.
130. [d. at 597.
131. [d. at 598.
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the restraining order was aimed expressly at publicity generated
during or immediately before trial, when the potential for
prejudice was greater. 132
The court then reviewed the narrowness of the order and
found that it was not unconstitutionally vague because it gave
clear guidance as to the types of punishable speech.133 However,
since many statements that bore upon the merits to be resolved
by the jury did not present a threat to the administration of justice, the court agreed with the In re Halkin case that the order
was overbroad. 134
The Ninth Circuit further found that the less restrictive alternatives outlined in Nebraska Press Association l31l would be
ineffective or counterproductive in this situation. 136 For example, while a searching vior dire might eliminate bias caused by
extrajudicial statements, it would not neutralize the prejudice
caused during trial nor assuage harm inflicted on the integrity of
132. Id. The court distinguished Nebraska Press Ass'n, CBS, and Associated Press,
and explained that in those cases prior restraints were aimed solely at pretrial publicity
and were invalidated on the grounds that an impartial jury could not be selected. Id. at
598. See also Chicago Council of Lawyers, 522 F.2d at 253-54 (possibility of prejudice
"more concrete" the closer to trial).
133. 764 F.2d at 599. Cf. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 371 (4th Cir. 1979Hholding that "other matters that are reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial" is too
vague).
134. 764 F.2d at 599 (citing In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 196-97 & n.51 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979». It suggested the self-imposed limitations set forth in
28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b) for specific statements proscribed for the prosecution. The court also
listed a number of subjects which would be applicable to the defense:
(1) the character, credibility, or reputation of a party;
(2) the identity of a witness or the expected testimony of a
party or a witness;
(3) the contents of any pretrial confession, admission or statement given by the defendant or that person's refusal or failure
to make a statement;
(4) the identity or physical evidence expected to be presented
or the absence of such physical evidence;
(5) the strengths and weaknesses of the case of either party;
and
(6) any other information the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence and would
create a substantial risk of prejudice if disclosed.
Id.
135. 427 U.S. at 563-64.
136. 764 F.2d at 599-600.
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the judicial process. 137 Also, the court concluded that use of emphatic and clear instructions was frequently ineffective. 13s Likewise, a change of venue or postponement of trial would not suffice because national news coverage was involved and the threat
of publicity would not abate. 13B Lastly, sequestering the jury
might unnecessarily incur resentment or harassment and disrupt
the quality of the jury's deliberations. 140 This, the court reasoned, would misplace the burden of prejudicial publicity on the
jurors rather than on the attorneys who had caused it. 141
The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for the writ of mandamus 142 because it concluded that the order restraining the attorneys' extrajudicial statements was appropriate in light of the
inadequacies of other remedies. 143 The reasons for the district
court's order had adequately outweighed the heavy presumption
against the validity of a prior restraint. H4 Accordingly, it upheld
the gag order, but directed the district court to specify the proscribed types of statements. l411
137. Id. The district court found it ironic that it addressed the restraining order on
the same day that it received a suggested voir dire questionnaire concerned with pretrial
publicity. Id. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that counsels' misinterpretation of their obligations concerning prejudicial comments would continue during trial
and the voir dire would be powerless to eliminate the prejudice caused by such publicity.
Id. at 600.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 601.
142. Id. To determine the validity of issuing a writ of mandamus the court applied
the guidelines set forth in Bauman v. United States District Court:
(1) The party seeking the writ has no other adequate means,
such as direct appeal, to attain the relief he or she desires. (2)
The petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal . . . . (3) The district court's order is
clearly erroneous as a matter of law. (4) The district court's
order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests a persistent disregard of the federal rules. (5) The district court's order raises
new and important problems or issues of law of first
impression.
Id. at 593-94 (citing Bauman v. United States District Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th
Cir. 1977». The court found the first three requirements were fulfilled and exercised its
jurisdiction under mandamus. 764 F.2d at 593-94.
143. Id. at 601.
144. See supra notes 44-45.
145. 764 F.2d at 601.
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CONCURRENCE

Judge Sneed wrote separately to express a slightly different
view. 148 The concurrence initially suggested that an attorney's
respect for the profession and the integrity of the judicial process should eliminate the need for these gag orders.147 It admitted, however, that the level of professional conduct needed, and
the incapacity of bar associations to secure such conduct, required the court to fix limits on the attorneys' "lobbying efforts."148 Under the facts of this case, the concurrence agreed
that the imposition of the gag order was proper.149
Additionally, the concurring opinion agreed with the majority that while the accused may seek, to some extent, a partial
jury, the sixth amendment does not guarantee such a right. uo
Moreover, the concurrence noted that the sixth amendment does
not guarantee society a fair trial, but that society nonetheless
expects one. un Yet because the accused has a right to an impartial jury and the people merely an expectation of one, restraints
on prosecutors may be more stringent than those on defense
counsel. 1112 Thus where speech provokes or threatens an impartial jury or fair trial, the concurrence reluctantly agreed that
courts could impose narrowly drawn restraints. IllS

C.

DISSENT

Judge Nelson, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
could not totally concur because she did not find an adequate
showing of a clear and imminent danger or a serious and imminent threat to an impartial jury.1114 Following the Ninth Circuit's
earlier opinion in Columbia Broadcasting Systems v. United
States District Court/ 1I11 the dissent focused on the impact of
146.
147.
148.
149.

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

[d. at 601-03.
[d. at 601 (Sneed, J., concurring).

[d. at 601-02 (Sneed, J., concurring).
[d. at 602 (Sneed, J., concurring).
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 603 (Sneed, J., concurring).
[d. See CBS v. United States District Court, 729 F.2d 1174, 1178-82 (9th Cir.

1983).
155. 729 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1983).
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the pretrial publicity rather than on its source. 156 In assessing
the prejudicial nature of pretrial publicity, the court in CBS had
looked not only to the effect that the publicity might have had
on the individual, but also to the impact that the publicity
might have had to inflame the entire community. 157
The dissent then argued that among twelve million people
in the Central District of California an unbiased panel of jurors
could be selected. 158 The dissent found that gag orders on attorneys' statements were not always impermissible but rather distinguished the situation where the jury had been empaneled. 159
In addition, the trial court judge would need to scrutinize anew
the alternatives to the gag order.160 Remedies such as jury sequestration and curative jury instructions would require re-examination of the degree and nature of the publicity at that time,
as well as of the efficacy of the proposed order in curbing the
publicity.161
The dissent sympathized with the concerns about the professional obligation of lawyers to refrain from engaging in publicity campaigns and noted that rules of professional conduct are
post-judgment remedies which are less effective but safer than
prior restraints. 162 On this record, however, the dissenting opinion noted that the publicity in this case was likely to be widespread even if the attorneys' comments were restrained and, as a
result, the benefits to the sixth amendment did not outweigh the
costs to the first amendment. 16s
156. 764 F.2d at 603 (Nelson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See supra
note 52 and accompanying text.
157. 729 F.2d at 1180. See also Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727 (1961) (murder
conviction. reversed because "pattern of deep and bitter prejudice [was] shown to be
present throughout the community.").
158. 764 F.2d at 603-04 (Nelson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
159. [d.
160. [d. at 604 (Nelson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
161. [d. Cf. Associated Press v. United States District Court, 705 F.2d 1143 (9th

Cir. 1983). In Associated Press, the Ninth Circuit struck down a court-ordered sealing of
documents finding that there was not a " 'substantial probability that closure [would] be
effective in protecting against the perceived harm.''' [d. at 1146 (quoting United States
v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1982)).
162. 764 F.2d at 604 (Nelson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
163. [d. See also Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 370 (4th Cir. 1979) (efficacy of
the tactic of silencing attorneys is not complete answer since others, like police officers,
speak to the press; but attorneys as officers of the court are held to a higher standard).
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IV. CRITIQUE
The trial court in this case was faced with the fact that prejudicial publicity had been generated and would continue to escalate. An initial admonition by the court to the parties to voluntarily restrain from prejudicial comments had gone
unheeded. IS' As the Ogorodnikovs' trial neared, defense attorneys' extrajudicial statements increased. lSG Contemplating the
dangers posed to the defendant's right to a fair trial, the court
felt pressed to issue the gag order. ISS
The use of a prior restraint inevitably raises the question of
whether such a drastic measure is ever appropriate. ls7 The Supreme Court's hostility to prior restraints on the press is evident
from its consistency in overruling such orders. lS8 Few-exceptions
have been countenanced. ls9 Nonetheless, recent court decisions
have embraced the suggestions set forth in Sheppard v. Maxwell l70 and have increasingly opted to gag attorneys and other
164. See supra note 11.
165. 764 F.2d at 592. When the Ninth Circuit denied the government's motion for
an order restraining extrajudicial comments on December 14, 1984, defense counsel advised the court they they might "at some future time deem it necessary in the interest of
our client to make a statement outside the courtroom." [d.
166. [d. See supra note 8.
167. See supra notes 44-45.
168. In 1977 Stanford's Law School held a symposium in which numerous authors
reviewed the Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart decision. See, e.g., Goodall, The Press Ungagged: The Practical Effect on Gag Order Litigation of Nebraska Press Association v.
Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REV. 497, 512-13 (1977); Portman, The Defense of Fair Trial from
Sheppard to Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart: Benign Neglect to Affirmative Action
and Beyond, 29 STAN. L. REV. 393, 409 (1977); Sack, Principle and Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REV. 411, 427 (1977); B. Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of Freedom and Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REV. 431, 468
(1977); R. Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An Open or Shut Decision?, 29 STAN. L.
REV. 529, 534 (1977).
169. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota ex rei. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). The Supreme
Court struck down an injunction involving a state statute which allowed enjoining any
"malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical." [d. at
701-02. The trial court had issued a permanent injunction against the defendant who
had published anti-Semitic articles critical of local officials. The Supreme Court reversed
the conviction on the grounds that a prior restraint is the "essence of censorship." [d. at
713. The Court mentioned only three "exceptional cases" in which a prior restraint
might be acceptable: (1) to prevent actual obstruction to the government's recruiting or
publishing the sailing dates of transports, or the number and location of troops; (2) in
obscene materials; and (3) to avoid acts of violence and the overthrow of the government.
[d. at 701-02. See also cases cited infra note 179.
170. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). See supra note 26.
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trial participants. 17l
It is not surprising that the Ninth Circuit viewed the facts
here, involving the first FBI agent to be charged with espionage
and of having an affair with his co-defendant, as the substance
of potentially pervasive news coverage. 172 However, the publicity
here was not of the inflammatory and lurid nature that the Supreme Court had previously condemned. 173 Since not all publicity, even if pervasive, denies a defendant a fair trial,174 the Ninth
Circuit's affirmation of the prior restraint in this case attracts
close scrutiny.

The court's focus on attorneys as the source of the detrimental publicity rather than on the actual impact of that publicity led to a rule that inhibits the inherent function of the
press. 1711 Silencing attorneys of necessity implicates the media's
access to that information.178 Limiting information is significant
only when the attorneys are restricted access to the media who
disseminate those comments to the public. Thus, whatever the
courts choose to call it, the ultimate focus still must be on the
press. Within this context, Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart
has signalled the Supreme Court's hostility to the prior re171. E.g., In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979).
The District of Columbia Circuit noted that an order directed only at trial participants
represented a less sweeping curtailment of first amendment rights than an order broadly
restraining the press. Id. at 195 & n.44.
172. See supra note 3.
173. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 542-43 (1976)(six
members of family found murdered in their home; defendant had committed murders in
course of sexual assault); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 335-36 (1966)(defendant
accused of bludgeoning his pregnant wife). See supra note 51.
174. See supra note 18.
175. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). There the Supreme Court
remarked:
A principle is that the effective self-government cannot succeed unless the people are immersed in a steady, robust, unimpeded, and uncensored flow of opinion and reporting which
are continuously subjected to critique, rebuttal, and re-examination. In this respect [the reporter's) status as a news gatherer and an integral part of that process becomes critical.
Id. at 715. See also Levine, 775 F.2d 1054, 1055 (9th Cir. 1985) (Norris, J., dissenting
from the denial of rehearing en banc)(to uphold the gag order "will significantly restrict
the media's ability to gather information and the public's right to be informed about our
criminal justice system.").
176. Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An Open or Shut Decision?, 29 STAN. L.
REV. 529, 530 (1977).
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straint. 177 It is well established that the public's need for a free
flow of information is paramount. 178 Indeed, with few narrow exceptions, cases raising a press issue in the interest of a fair trial
have held the restraints to be unconstitutional. 179
This change in focus from the press to the attorneys is not,
at first blush, too significant since the Ninth Circuit appropriately confirmed the "clear and present danger" standard used to
test a restraining order's validity. By holding that the record
supported a clear and imminent danger, however, the court has
required a less rigorous showing than has been demanded in the
traditional press cases established in Nebraska Press Association and its progeny.180
Following Nebraska Press Association, the Ninth Circuit
reviewed the efficacy of the more traditional, less burdensome
alternatives.l8l In Levine, however, the court made no attempt
to determine the effect of the publicity on the entire community.
In Columbia Broadcasting Systems v. United States District
Court, the court held that "in a large metropolitan area, prejudicial publicity is less likely to endanger" the right of an accused
to a fair trial. 182 Moreover, the Levine court reasoned that voir
dire could not eliminate prejudice caused during the trial. 183 Yet,
177. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). See supra note 45.
178. See Note, supra note 46, at 96-97.
179. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). See also New York Times v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). There, Justice Black viewed the publishing of the
Pentagon Papers as "paramount among the responsibilities of a free press [whose duty
is) to prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them
off to distant lands to die." [d. at 717. The Court recognized a narrow military exception
which might justify the prior restraint when disclosure "will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people." [d. at 730. In Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-83 (1957), the validity of federal and state obscenity
laws were sustained. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for mailing obscene
books and advertisements and noted that "obscenity [is) utterly without redeeming social importance" and thus "not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or
press." [d. at 485-86. In Chaplinsky v. New Hamphshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942), the
Supreme Court upheld a conviction under a statute based upon the "fighting words"
doctrine declaring that libel, obscenity and "fighting words" are not afforded first
amendment protection.
180. See supra note 34.
181. 764 F.2d at 599-600.
182. 729 F.2d 1174, 1181 (9th Cir. 1983).
183. In CBS, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court's reasoning amounted
to a general rejection of voir dire as an effective alternative to prior restraints, when the
district court stated that "No matter how searching the questions ... certain matters
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it made no attempt to consider the effect of repeated and strong
admonitions both to the trial participants and to the jury during
the triaP84 Nor did the court consider the actual impact, if any,
that the publicity would have on the jury.1811 The Ninth Circuit
further accepted the district court's reasoning that sequestration
is a greater burden than the effects of the restraining order.18s
By doing this the court ignored the fact that although this measure would insulate jurors only after they are sworn, it would
also enhance likelihood of diffusing the impact of pretrial publicity and emphasize the elements of the jurors' oaths. 187 Essentially, the court focused its attention on a potentially burdened
jury rather than on the interests of the public in obtaining the
information or on the attorneys' freedom of expression.
Above all, the court did not emphasize sufficiently the ethical obligations imposed by the disciplinary rules which regulate
attorneys' conduct. 188 While it is true that these disciplinary
measures would come into effect only after the extrajudicial
statements were made, subsequent remedies are a solution consistent with the entire penal process. An accused who has been
denied a fair trial may always exercise his right to appeal. This
remedy is undoubtedly time consuming and costly but so too is
the resort to a prior restraint. 18s It is inevitable in a fair trialfree speech case that the court will be compelled to elect the
preeminence of one constitutional right over another. ISO As
Judge Nelson noted in her dissenting opinion, "concern over the
professional ethics of those who try their cases in the press, however, should not replace dispassionate analysis when First
Amendment freedoms are in the balance."lsl
are not detectable, especially those motives to bias and prejudice." 729 F.2d at 1182.
184. Although unconventional, the court could consider continuing voir dire during
the trial.
185. In CBS, the court noted that potential jurors are untainted by press coverage
even when exposed to widespread publicity. 729 F.2d at 1179. In November, 1985,
Miller's trial for espionage ended in a mistrial giving support to the truth of this
statement.
186. 764 F.2d at 600.
187. 427 U.S. at 564.
188. 764 F.2d at 601 (Sneed, J., concurring).
189. See supra note 44.
190. Erickson, Fair Trial and Free Press: The Practical Dilemma, 29 STAN. L. REV.
485, 489 (1977).
191. 764 F.2d at 604 (Nelson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). In the denial of the rehearing en bane, the dissenting opinion argued that the range of options
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CONCLUSION

Absent controlling Supreme Court precedent, Levine is the
first decision in any circuit approving a gag order on defense attorneys under the "clear and present danger" standard. ls2 The
decision is therefore likely to have adverse consequences on the
future of the free speech of trial participants. ls3 A potentially
dangerous effect is the possibility of chilling the speech of attorneys called upon to represent unpopular defendants in high visibility cases. IS4 The unpopular accused is especially dependent on
his attorney to speak out publicly because the need to mitigate
the damage caused by the indictment in the eyes of the community is magnified lsil and because the need to seek a partial jury is
critical. With the media's increasing interest in reporting on
criminal activities, upholding the gag order in this case may signal the court's willingness to temper its position as to the validity of prior restraints.

Elisa R. Paisner*

available to the attorney in defending his client must include publicly speaking out to
mitigate the damage caused to his client in the community by the government's accusation. 775 F.2d at 1055 (Norris, J., dissenting).
192.
193.
194.
195.

[d.
[d.
[d. at 1056.
[d. at 1055.

• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1987.
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UNITED STATES u. BRANSON:
NO NARROWING OF MIRANDA
I.

INTRODUCTION

In United States u. Branson/ the Ninth Circuit held that
the prosecution's repeated references to the fact that defendant
Roger Branson remained silent during his post-arrest interrogation, after he had been read his Miranda 2 rights, violated his
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 3
II. FACTS
Branson was arrested and charged with knowingly passing
counterfeit bills. 4 Following his arrest, after he had received the
Miranda warnings, Branson refused to respond when he was
asked about the source of the counterfeit money. Ii Later, at trial,
the prosecution referred to this silence as proof that Branson
1. 756 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1985) (per Ferguson, J.; the other panel members were
Pregerson, J., and Stephens, D.J., Senior United States District Judge for the Central
District of California, sitting by designation.
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See infra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
3. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall [any person] be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. 756 F.2d at 753.
5. [d. Branson was charged under a statute which requires that the government
prove knowledge of falsity as an element of the crime of counterfeiting. Branson was
arrested after he purchased a money order with three counterfeit bills. The Secret Service traced the bills through the money order to Branson. 18 U.S.C. § 472 (1970).
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knew the money was counterfeit. s A jury convicted Branson of
knowingly passing counterfeit money, and he appealed to the
Ninth Circuit.?
III. BACKGROUND
The fifth amendment commands that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. 8
In Miranda v. Arizona,9 the Supreme Court held that this privilege against self-incrimination can only be fulfilled if an individual's silence during an in-custody interrogation is protected from
the government's use of that silence as inferential proof of
guilt. 1o The Court stated that it is impermissible to penalize an
individual for exercising his fifth amendment privilege by allowing the prosecution to imply that silence in the face of an
accusation is in itself damning. l l
Miranda recognized that the fifth amendment privilege may
be waived.12 The Miranda Court held, however, that if the government claims a waiver, it bears a heavy burden of showing
that the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. IS Moreover, even after waiving the privilege by beginning to talk, a defendant may revoke this waiver by indicating in any manner, at
any time, prior to or during the interrogation, a desire to remain
silent. 14

The Ninth Circuit has recognized a selective revocation of a
6.Id.
7. Id. Branson did not object to the use of his silence by the prosecutor at trial
under the belief that an objection would compound the prejudice against him. SiMe
Branson did not object, the Ninth Circuit had to find a "plain error" in the proceedings
before review was proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b). Id.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda warnings consist of the following: (1) a person
has the right to remain silent, (2) anything he says can be used against him in a court of
law, (3) he has a right to the presence of an attorney, and (4) if he cannot afford an
attorney, one will be appointed for him. Unless the warnings are given and a knowing
and intelligent waiver demonstrated. evidence obtained as a result of the interrogation
may not be used against a defendant as proof of guilt. Id. at 478.
10. Id. at 460.
11. Id. at 468 n.37.
12. Id. at 473.
13. Id. at 475.
14. Id. at 473.
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waiver.lli A suspect may indicate a willingness to respond to
some questions and not to others, and this intermittent silence
will be protected. 16 The court established the limit of a selective
waiver in United States v. Lorenzo. 17 When the defendant refused to answer a single question in the midst of an extended,
entirely voluntary exculpatory statement, the court held that the
right to remain silent had not been invoked. IS In the court's
view, this brief silence merely amounted to an uncomfortable
pause during a narration, not an indication of a desire to remain
silent. 19 Consequently, the prosecutor's reference to the defendant's silence was not error, since that event was not protected by
the fifth amendment. 2o
The opposite result was reached by the court in Scarborough v. Arizona. 21 The defendant, after his arrest, neither answered questions, nor made an exculpatory statement. 22 At the
trial, the prosecutor pointed out that the defendant had remained silent after being accused of the crimes. 23 Since the defendant's conduct was a clear invocation of the fifth amendment
privilege, the court held that any reference to his silence was
fundamental error. 2 •
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
The primary issue considered by the court was whether
Branson had successfully revoked his initial waiver of the fifth
amendment privilege by refusing to continue responding to
questions after being asked where he had obtained the counterfeit bills. 21i
15. United States v. Lorenzo, 570 F.2d 294, 298 (9th Cir. 1978).
16. [d.
17. 570 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1978).
18. [d. at 298. Defendant Lorenzo, like Branson, was accused and convicted of
knowingly passing counterfeit money. [d. at 294.
19. [d. at 298.
20. [d.
21. 531 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1976). Defendant Scarborough was arrested for robbery
and assault with a deadly weapon. [d. at 960.
22. [d. at 960.
23. [d.
24. [d. at 961.
25. 756 F.2d at 753. The court also addressed the government's contention that,
even if there were prosecutorial error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and
did not contribute to the jury's verdict. There was dramatic evidence to the contrary,
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The court began its analysis by rejecting the government's
reliance on United States u. Lorenzo. 26 Factually, Lorenzo differed significantly from Branson. While Branson neither offered
an exculpatory story, nor resumed talking after initially refusing
to answer a question,27 Lorenzo's conduct was marked by a willingness to speak on his own behalf, both before and after refusing to answer the single question. 28 Branson had, by his unambiguous conduct, successfully communicated to the arresting
officers that he wished to remain silent. 29 Consequently, Branson
had totally revoked his earlier waiver of the privilege, and any
use of that protected silence was plain error. 30 The facts in
Branson more closely resembled those in Scarborough u. Arizona,31 since neither defendant resumed speaking after initially
refusing to answer a question, and neither offered an exculpatory narrative. 32 The Ninth Circuit, therefore, applied its holding in Scarborough to Branson by ruling that to allow the state
to use the defendant's silence against him would violate the
spirit of the fifth amendment. 88
V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit acted correctly in firmly rejecting the
government's attempt to narrow the right to revoke a waiver of
the fifth amendment privilege. Once the court decided that
Branson had revoked his waiver, the well-established principle
that a defendant's post-Miranda silence may not be used against
him controlled. The Ninth Circuit acted consistently with its
previous decisions, United States Supreme Court authority and
the Constitution, by properly refusing to countenance the prosehowever. After the jurors had begun their deliberations, they sent a note to the judge
asking him if they could base their decision on Branson's silence when he was asked
about the source of the money. The judge responded that they were free to consider any
relevant evidence. The court concluded that the reasonable inference was that the prosecutor's reference to Branson's silence did influence the verdict and that, therefore, it was
not harmless. [d. at 754.
26. 570 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1978).
27. 756 F.2d at 754.
28. [d. at 753.
29. [d.
30. [d. The use of this protected silence was the "plain error" needed by the reviewing court to overturn the lower court. See supra note 7.
31. 531 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1976).
32. 756 F.2d at 754.
33. [d.
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cution's use of a defendant's protected silence.

Michael S. Williams*

u.s.

I.

u. FLYNT: REAFFIRMING THE IMPORTANCE
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPACITY
TO COMMIT A CRIME

INTRODUCTION

In United States u. Flynt, l the Ninth Circuit held that the
district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a continuance to enable the defendant to obtain psychiatric evidence,
where his only defense to the charge of contempt of court was
lack of mental capacity to commit the offense. 2 The Ninth Circuit also ruled that the imposition of a summary contempt sentence is erroneous where there is a substantial issue as to the
defendant's mental capacity to commit contempt. 3
II. FACTS
Defendant Larry Flynt, during his arraignment on an indictment for flag desecration 4 and for illegally wearing a Purple
Heart, launched an obscene verbal attack on the federal magistrate conducting the proceeding. II The district judge, assigned by
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986
1. 756 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir.), modified, 764 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1985) (per Reinhardt,
J.; the other panel members were Fletcher, J., and Ely, J.). (Judge Ely died before the
opinion was prepared, but he heard the arguments and concurred in the result.)
2. [d. at 1362.
3. [d. at 1366.
4. Flynt wore an American flag as a diaper during an earlier, unrelated court appearance. [d. lit 1355.
5. Part of the dialogue between the magistrate and Flynt was as followa:
THE MAGISTRATE: All right. I am going to appoint
Mr. Isaacman to represent you as your attorney for these proceedings. you may choose to callTHE DEFENDANT: Then take my ass to jail, cocksucker, because 1-
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the magistrate to try the case, sent Flynt to the Medical Center
for Federal Prisoners to undergo a psychiatric examination to
determine his competence to stand trial. s The magistrate also
ordered Flynt to show cause before the Chief Judge to the District Court why he should not be held in criminal contempt for
the obscenities he hurled at the court during the arraignment.'
At the contempt hearing, Flynt's attorney informed the
court that the defense would be based on a lack of mental capacity to commit contempt, and requested a thirty-day continuance
to obtain expert testimony and substitute counsel,8 The court
THE MAGISTRATE: All right.
THE DEFENDANT: -refuse to go through this bullshit.
THE MAGISTRATE: All right, would you proceed with
the arraignment?
THE DEFENDANT: You, dumb, ignorant mother-fucker.
Now, I am telling you; you are not going to get away with this.
THE MAGISTRATE: Proceed with the arraignment.
THE DEFENDANT: There are [sic) no fucking way you
are going to get sway with it. You are denying me my counsel
of my choice. You are just as dumb as that goddamn Burger
up there on the Supreme Court, and I am ready to stay in jail
until hell freezes over or until I have the attorney of my
choice.
You goddamn, no good, 14 karat piece of shit. Just cause
you got on that robe, you don't have any goddamn right to
abuse the Constitution that you are supposed to be upholding.
[d. at 1355 n.l.
6. Flynt's psychiatric examinations were completed in January 1984. The government psychiatrists concluded that Flynt suffered a mental disease characterized by frenetic activity, restlessness, grandiosity, flight of ideas, instability, and antisocial behavior. The psychiatrists concluded that Flynt had an intense need for control and
attention, which manifested itself in abusive and uncontrollable courtroom behavior. The
report concluded, however, that Flynt was competent to stand trial. [d. at 1365.
7. [d. at 1355. One of the issues Flynt raised on appeal was that the magistrate's
assignment of the contempt hearing to the chief judge was not random as required by
General Order 224, Rule 8.1. (C.D. Cal. Rules of the Court). This Rule requires random
assignment of criminal cases to district judges to assure fairness and objectivity. The
government argued that only arraignable crimes are covered by this Rule. However, the
Ninth Circuit held that the crime of contempt is entitled to the same assurance of fairness as other crimes, and therefore Order 224 applies to criminal contempt proceedings
as well. 756 F.2d at 1355 n.2.
8. Because Flynt had been incarcerated prior to the hearing at the Medical Center
for Federal Prisoners, he had been unable to obtain examinations by psychiatrists of his
own choosing. Flynt made several attempts to consult with psychiatric experts while he
was at the Medical Center. He filed an ex parte application for transfer back to California to see his own psychiatrists, and also two habeas corpus petitions seeking both better
medical care at the Prisoners' Medical Center and opportunities to consult with witnesses regarding pending litigation. [d. at 1356.
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denied this motion, finding that there was no basis for the request. A one-day continuance was granted to permit Flynt to obtain substitute counsel, and the hearing was continued the following day.9
Defense counsel renewed the motion for a thirty-day continuance when the hearing reconvened, presenting evidence that
Flynt's psychiatric experts could not complete their evaluation
within the previously granted one-day continuance. Once again,
the motion was denied. 10
During this second appearance, Flynt responded with a
number of obscene epithets when asked about his outbursts at
the arraignment. l l Flynt was gagged and was admonished that
further outbursts would be punished by summary contempt citations. With the gag removed, he engaged in several additional
bouts of offensive language. After each, he was summarily found
guilty of contempt, and sentenced to thirty-day prison terms.lI
At the close of the hearing, the district court found Flynt
guilty of contempt at the time of the arraignment, and sentenced him to six-months' imprisonment. This sentence provoked another outburst, and the judge summarily sentenced him
to an additional six months in prison. The contempt sentences
9. [d.

10. Flynt's attorney informed the judge that a psychiatrist, psychologist and a
psychopharmacologist had all been contacted and had agreed to evaluate Flynt, but
could not do so within the constraint of a one-day continuance. Flynt's defense consequently consisted of nonexpert witnesses whose attempts to testify as to Flynt's mental
condition were disallowed by the district judge on the ground of lack of qualifications.
[d.
11. The following is an example of Flynt's abusive language, spoken when the judge
had concluded sentencing:
THE DEFENDANT: Give me more, mother-fucker. Is
that all you can give me, you chicken shit cocksucker? Lay 18
months on me, you dumb mother-fucker.
THE COURT: NowTHE DEFENDANT: Fuck you in your ass.
THE COURT: That is enough.
THE DEFENDANT: You suckTHE COURT: That will be another six months which will
also be consecutive.
THE DEFENDANT: I want you to give me more. Give
me more.
[d. at 1357 n.6.
12. [d. at 1357.
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totalled fifteen months. 13 Flynt appealed the contempt convictions to the Ninth Circuit.
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit first analyzed the district court's denial
of a continuance. It then addressed the judge's use of the summary contempt power.
A.

THE DENIAL OF A CONTINUANCE

1. Background

In considering the denial of the continuance,14 the Ninth
Circuit focused on the procedural fairness of the proceedings, as
there was no question that the contempt had been committed. 1 Ii
In particular, it recognized the recent Supreme Court decision in
Ake v. Oklahoma,18 which emphasized the crucial importance
psychiatric testimony may have whenever the defendant's
mental condition is relevant to criminal culpability.
Four factors were identified as relevant in deciding whether
13. [d. Flynt served more than five months in prison before being released by a
Ninth Circuit panel pending this review. [d. at 1358.
14. The lower court's discretion to deny or grant a continuance will not be disturbed
on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion. A clear abuse of discretion will not be
found unless the lower court's action was arbitrary or unreasonable. [d.
15. [d.

16. 108 S.Ct. 1087 (1985). When an indigent defendant in a murder prosecution was
not provided with psychiatric assistance to support an insanity defense, the Supreme
Court stated: "[W]hen the State has made the defendant's mental condition relevant to
his criminal culpability, and to the punishment he might suffer, the assistance of a psychiatrist may well be crucial to the defendant's ability to marshall his defense." [d. at
1095.
See also United States v. Fessel, 531 F.2d 1275, 1280-81 (5th Cir. 1976) (abuse of
discretion to deny a continuance to obtain psychiatric records to establish insanity defense where this was the only defense available); United States v. Walker, 537 F.2d 1192,
1194 (4th Cir. 1976) (abuse of discretion to deny a continuance to obtain psychiatric
evidence where psychiatrist had determined in only a 30-minute examination that defendant was competent to stand trial).
The test in the Ninth Circuit for determining the mental capacity to commit an
offense is whether "at the time of the alleged criminal conduct, as a result of mental
disease or defect [the defendant] lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to
the requirements of the law or to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct." Flynt, 756
F.2d at 1365 n.11 (quoting United States v. Monroe, 552 F.2d 860, 863 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 972 (1977)).
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Flynt's procedural rights had been violated. First, the appellant
must have been diligent in preparing his defense prior to the
hearing. I7 Second, the continuance must serve a useful purpose.I 8 Third, the reviewing court must examine the inconvenience that might be caused to the district court or to the opposing party if the continuance is granted. I9 Finally, the court must
weigh the harm to the appellant caused by the denial of the
continuance. 2o

2.

Discussion

With regard to the first factor, the court noted that Flynt
had been sufficiently diligent in preparing his defense. 21 While
incarcerated in the Medical Center, he had sought release, to no
avail, for the purpose of obtaining psychiatric evaluations,22 but
had remained in detention until three days before the hearing. 23
Moreover, at the time of requesting the continuance, he had
contacted and retained psychiatric experts; the one-day continuance granted by the court was, however, insufficient to conduct
17. See, e.g., United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 926 (1977). Defendant, on trial for the sale of cocaine, had more than a month to
find substitute counsel before trial. Not only was defendant's failure to secure substitute
counsel due to lack of due diligence, but also the defendant made no showing that
prejudice was caused by denial of a continuance. [d. at 744. Cf. United States v. Barret,
703 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1983). When the defendant was notified only eight days before
trial that the government was going to use an expert to establish identification through
photographs taken at bank robbery, and defendant's diligent effort to obtain his own
expert was unavailing, the court's failure to grant a continuance to secure an expert was
a clear abuse of discretion. [d. at 1080.
18. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 608 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1979). Defendant, a
heroin dealer, did not show that he would be able to make use of a continuance, since he
presented no showing that the sought-after evidence was obtainable or actually existed.
[d. at 746.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Shuey, 541 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1092 (1977). In a prosecution under the Mann Act (18 U.S.C. § 2422,), a continuance to obtain substitute counsel was properly denied when the government had obtained six witnesses from another state. [d. at 847.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 706 F.2d 1044, 1053 (9th Cir. 1983). Defendant
failed to show he was prejudiced by the denial of a continuance since he was unable to
identify any evidence he would have been able to present had the continuance been
granted. [d. at 1053.
21. In reaching the conclusion that diligence had been shown, the court did not go
so far as to ratify Flynt's course of conduct. The court conceded that in other circumstances, Flynt might fail to satisfy the diligence factor. Flynt, 756 F.2d at 1360.
22. 756 F.2d at 1359.
23. [d.
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the necessary tests. 24
The second factor considered was whether the continuance
under the circumstances of this case would have been useful to
him in establishing a viable defense. 211 The Ninth Circuit observed that the evidence before the district court of Flynt's defense that he lacked mental capacity to commit contempt, his
erratic behavior, and the availability of psychiatric experts, as
well as other factors,26 clearly indicated that the testimony
would be relevant. In this situation, the showing that expert testimony was available and relevant was held to be sufficient to
demonstrate the usefulness of a continuance. 27
The third factor, inconvenience to the court or opposing
party, was not an obstacle to the granting of the continuance in
this case. It would not have involved any rescheduling difficulties for the court, and the government had no witnesses to call. 28
The fourth factor, prejudice, was critical to the decision to
overrule the denial of the continuance. 29 Flynt's courtroom conduct could not be disputed, and the sole defense was that he
lacked the requisite mental capacity to commit the offense. He
could not establish this defense without expert witnesses. The
court discounted the testimony of the non-expert witnesses who
did testify precisely because they lacked any qualifications to
testify on the subject. so In view of the pivotal role played by expert testimony, the trial court's denial of a continuance effectively deprived Flynt of the opportunity to present any defense.
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the denial of the
continuance was arbitrary and unreasonable. SI
24. See supra note 10.
25. 756 F.2d at 1360.
26. [d. The district court had before it the report from the Medical Center. See
supra note 6.
27. The court concluded that the district judge could not reasonably have demanded
greater specificity than that the evidence would be relevant since he had denied Flynt an
opportunity to gather that evidence. 756 F.2d at 1360.
28. [d.
29. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. The importance of psychiatric testimony was "compelling" in the Ninth Circuit's view, and Flynt suffered "severe"
prejudice by being denied expert psychiatric testimony. 756 F.2d at 1361-62.
30. See supra note 10.
31. 756 F.2d at 1362.
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USE OF SUMMARY CONTEMPT POWER

The district court, viewing Flynt's obscene disruptions during the contempt hearing, exercised its power to punish contumacious behavior through summary proceedings. 32 The Ninth
Circuit addressed the question of whether this summary contempt power had been appropriately exercised. 33
1. Background

There are two statutory prerequisites for the exercise of the
power to summarily punish a defendant for contempt of court.
First, the contempt must have occurred within the sight and
hearing of the judge. Second, the conduct must have taken place
in the actual presence of the court.34 However, since the use of
the power dispenses with ordinarily required procedural protections, it is only appropriate when the court is fully cognizant of
all the facts bearing on the contumacious conduct, and when instant punishment is necessary to avoid disruption of ongoing
proceedings. 311 In all cases, only the least possible power to
32. The source of the district court's summary contempt power lies in the Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure which states in pertinent part:
a. A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if
the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct
constituting the contempt and that it was committed
in the actual presence of the court.
b. A criminal contempt ... shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice shall [allow] a reasonable time for the
preparation of the defense . . . . If the contempt
charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge,
that judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial or
hearing.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 42.
33. The appellate court reviewed the lower court's action under an abuse of discretion standard. 756 F.2d at 1362 (citing United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309 (1975».
When witnesses who were granted immunity in a robbery prosecution refused to testify,
there was no abuse of discretion in imposing a summary contempt sentence to protect
the orderly progress of a criminal trial, especially when judge, jurors, and witnesses were
all waiting, and the refusal to testify was an open, serious threat to the continuation of
the trial. United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. at 319.
34. The justifications for the summary contempt power include the fact that a judge
must have a method of immediately remedying in-court disruption of ongoing proceedings, and also that the judge, being a percipient witness, has the facts of the contempt·
before him. Flynt, 756 F.2d at 1363.
35. Id. at 1364.
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achieve the proposed end may be used. 36 Since it combines the
functions of judge, jury, and prosecutor in one person, the summary contempt power is subject to abuse, and therefore its use
must remain extraordinary and undertaken only after careful
thought. 37
In Panico v. United States,as the defendant was summarily
cited for his courtroom behavior, despite a contention that
mental illness made him incapable of forming the criminal intent requisite for the crime. 39 The Supreme Court held that fair
administration of criminal justice requires a plenary hearing
under Federal Rule Criminal Procedure 42(b)·o to determine a
defendant's criminal responsibility for his conduct.41
In Rollerson v. United States,·2 the District of Columbia
Circuit struck down a summary contempt conviction imposed by
a district judge after the defendant threw a water pitcher at the
prosecutor. The defendant's evidence as to his insanity
presented as a defense to the underlying charge raised a substantial issue· 3 as to his criminal responsibility for his in-court
conduct. Therefore, a Rule 42(b) evidentiary hearing was
mandated.··
2.

Discussion

In Flynt, the judge had both seen and heard the contempt,
and it had occurred in the actual presence of the district court.411
However, that court had before it evidence that raised a sub36. [d. at 136~ (citing United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 316 (1975».
37. United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 319 (1975). See also United States v.
Gustafson, 650 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981). In this case, a lawyer who continually disobeyed the court's instructions was summarily cited for contempt. The Ninth Circuit
stated that because the summary contempt power has a manifest potential for abuse, a
full Rule 42(b) hearing will be required if the judge cannot marshall all the facts to
support the summary action. [d. at 1020.
38. 375 U.S. 29 (1975).
39. [d. at 30.
40. See supra note 32.
41. 375 U.S. at 30.
42. 343 F.2d 269 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
43. Flynt, 756 F.2d at 1364 (citing Rollerson v. United States, 343 F.2d 269, 277
(D.C. Cir. 1964))(emphasis added in Flynt, 756 F.2d at 1364).
44. 343 F.2d at 277.
45. 756 F.2d at 1364.
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stantial issue as to Flynt's criminal responsibility.46 The district
court had the Medical Center's report detailing Flynt's personality disorders. Additionally, the judge had witnessed Flynt's violet language and bizarre behavior.47 Without further information
about the psychiatric basis and causation of this behavior, the
court was not equipped to decide whether the defendant was capable of the crime. The Ninth Circuit, therefore, adopted the
"substantial issue" test developed in Rollerson. Because the district court did not hold a full Rule 42(b) hearing, even though
Flynt had clearly raised a substantial issue as to his mental capacity, his summary convictions of contempt were reversed. 48
III. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit correctly concluded that Flynt was unfairly denied a continuance that would certainly have been pivotal to his defense. The evidence of mental instability was simply too dramatic to ignore, and therefore prejudice to Flynt
entirely outweighed any relevant countervail~ng considerations.
The Ninth Circuit also properly struck down the district
court's summary imposition of punishment. However extreme
the provocation, the Ninth Circuit could not countenance the
abuse of the summary contempt power. A judge may never invoke the power beyond the minimum needs of the court, and in
the future may not do so at all where a substantial issue is raised
concerning the defendant's criminal capacity. By reversing the
convictions, the Ninth Circuit strongly vindicated the crucial
46. [d. at 1365. The court also questioned the district judge's imposition of a sixmonth sentence at the close of the hearing. There was no disruption of ongoing proceedings since the proceedings were ending. [d. at 1366 n.13.
47. [d. at 1366-67. The fact that the judge had witnessed Flynt's remarks was significant in another context as well. A judge should recuse himself in the interests of fairness
if that judge was the object of the contemnor's attacks. [d. at 1366 n.13. Under a Rule
42(b) hearing, a judge involved in the contempt must not preside over the contempt
hearing. See supra note 32.
48. 756 F.2d at 1366. Appellate courts have a special responsibility to protect
against abuse of the summary contempt power. See supra note 37 and accompany text.
In Flynt, the court decided that remanding the case would serve no purpose, since the
five months already served by Flynt were clearly in excess of the least possible power
adequate to achieve the proposed end, which was presumably vindication of the court's
authority. Rather, the punishment meted out may have instead accomplished Flynt's
purposes, since he could then see that his abusive language had hit the bull's eye. Therefore, all of Flynt's contempt convictions were vacated and reversed. 756 F.2d at 1366.
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importance of a defendant's mental state to a fair adjudication
of guilt or innocence.

Michael S. Williams·
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